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CASE NOTES
Anti-Trust—Corporate Officer Prosecuted under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act—Section 14 of the Clayton Act Distinguished.—United States
v. Wise. 1—A corporation and one of its officers were prosecuted for violation
of the anti-trust laws. The government charged the officer had "been acting
solely in his capacity as an officer, director, or agent who authorized or
ordered, or did some of the acts" constituting the violation. The officer
moved for a dismissal on the ground that the government failed to charge a
crime in that the Sherman Act does not apply to corporate officers acting
in a representative capacity. The District Court2
 thereupon dismissed the
prosecution as to the officer, and the government appealed. The decision
was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court. HELD: A corporate
officer is subject to prosecution under Section 1 of the Sherman Act which
imposes criminal sanctions upon "every person" who violates the act, when-
ever he knowingly participates in effecting an illegal contract, combination
or conspiracy, regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity.
On its face, the decision easily conforms to the wording of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. However, in the interim between the lower court decision
in the present case and Supreme Court's reversal, five district courts agreed
with the lower court,3
 while only two courts adopted the position eventually
taken by the Supreme Court.4
The point of controversy is in defining the respective roles of Section 1
of the Sherman Acts and Section 14 of the Clayton Act. 8
 When the Clayton
Act was first enacted some members of Congress felt that Section 14 was an
unnecessary repetition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 7 while others felt it
would complement the section without disturbing it.8
 This historical argu-
ment, however, should not be conclusive since both sides quote the Con-
gressional debates to support their view, thus creating a futile game of
rhetorical tug-of-war. It may be noted that prior to the passage of the
Clayton Act in 1914 the cases tended to establish the liability of an officer
even when he acted solely in a representative capacity.° Even after 1914 the
1
 United States v. Wise, 82 Sup. Ct. 1354 (1962).
2
 United States v. National Dairy Prod., 196 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
8 United States v. A. P. Woodson Co., 198 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1961) ; United
States v. American Optical Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) ¶I 70,156 (E.D. Wis.
Nov, 3, 1961) ; United States v. Engelhard-Hanovia, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., Crim. No. 30,132, S.D. Cal., 1962;
United States v. Milk Distrib. Ass'n., 200 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1961).
4
 United States v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.
1962) ; United States v. Packard Bell Electronics, Crim. No. 30,158, S.D. Cal., 1962.
5
 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
7
 51 Cong, Rec. 14214 (1914) (remarks of Senator Shields).
8
 Id. at 16317 (remarks of Representative Floyd).
9
 In Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. .599, 618 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 635 (1915), the court stated that section 1 "includes conspiracies between com-
petitors, or between the officers and agents of a competitor on its behalf against a
competitor." See United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578 (1st Cir. 1912), aff'd, 227
U.S. 202 (1915).
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government still continued to use section 1 regardless of the representative
capacity of the accused. In spite of this fact, the question as to the exact
nature of these sections did not become acute until 1955, when the penalty
of section I became more severe than that of the unchanged Clayton Act.'°
The courts not in agreement with the Supreme Court believe that it is
reasonable to assume that the Clayton Act did have a specific purpose. Rest-
ing on the presumption against a construction which would render a statute
ineffective or inefficient, and following the notion that specific terms prevail
over general, these courts, agreeing with the district court in the present
case, espoused the view that section 14 is the vehicle intended by Congress
to criminally prosecute an officer acting in a representative capacity, while
the Sherman Act is the process encompassing violations of an individual
nature." Assuming an alleged act is violative of the anti-trust provisions; as
a corporate officer, under what situation could he act individually? It
would appear that his acts would always be in a representative capacity
when dealing with corporate affairs. In effect, as to corporate officers, the
Clayton Act is promoted to the dominant role, a result impliedly rejected by
the Supreme Court in the instant case.
One of these courts expressed a dim view of the government's continued
use of section 1 : 12
The position of the government seems to be that although the
individual defendants are charged with doing what was done by
them in a representative capacity, it was of such a character as to
impose upon them the liability they would have had, had they been
acting as individuals. The government therefore contends that al-
though the individual defendants are clearly liable under section 14
of the Clayton Act, they are also guilty of violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act; that the government may proceed under either
section; that if it proceeds under section 1 and the evidence fails to
suffice for a conviction, the same evidence may justify a verdict
under section 14 . . . . The government admits that it is literally
impossible to charge a corporate officer with violating section 1 of
the Sherman Act in his official capacity without using the language
of section 14 to describe his offence.
In a footnote the court commented that if the same evidence is required for
prosecution under both acts as the government stated, then they are the same.
But the government conceded that it is possible to have a section 14 con-
10
 The fine was raised from $5,000 to $50,000. Congress has now before it a proposed
amendment (H. R. 8136, 8138 & 8139, 87th Cong., lit Sess. (1961)) which will have the
effect of raising both acts to $100,000 for individual offenders.
11
 The view of the five courts was fairly summed up in United States v. National
Dairy Prod., 196 F. Supp. 639 (W,D. Mo. 1961):
Under clear Congressional interpretations, the Sherman Act governs the prosecu-
tion and punishment of principals, i.e., corporations and individuals acting on
their own behalf, while section 14 of the Clayton Act covers the prosecution
and punishment of individuals who, as corporate officials, took part in the
corporate violation.
12 United States v. Milk Distrib. Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 792, 796 (D. Md. 1961).
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viction when a section I conviction is impossible and that it is even easier
to obtain a conviction under section 14. This concession, in the court's
opinion, exposed the inconsistency of the government's position. As the court
stated, "Whether all this is done with mirrors is not clear. Certainly, like
St. Paul, this court sees through the glass darkly." 13
Just as the views above were embraced vigorously, 'so the opposition
states its views in no uncertain terms. It was decided in United States v.
North American Van Lines" that the Clayton Act was designed to make an
officer responsible in the rare situations where his actions, alone, are innocent.
The section would then cover a situation in which an officer did an act which,
standing alone, might not be a violation of an anti-trust penal provision, but
when accompanied by the acts of other officers and culminating in improper
action by the corporation, would become noxious." Thus, section 14 is in no
way a limitation to section 1 and one could be guilty of violating both acts.
The confusion of this rhetoric illustrates that the respective roles of the
sections cannot be effectively explained by their legislative history.
Even though we discard the congressional history, it is possible to find
some answers from the era that produced the legislation. It must be re-
membered that the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, the same decade which
saw the Pullman strike; which almost saw Jim Fiske and Jay Could corner
the gold market; and which closed with a flood of imperialism manifested
in the Spanish American War. Against this background, it becomes clear
that while the legislature passed the Sherman Act, the nation and the courts
were not of such a "socialistic" bent. As an illustration, the Sherman Act was
first used against the labor unions," while the courts sterilized the act
against the trusts themselves." At any rate, the same public mood which
had at first stunted the Sherman Act nursed that act into prominence, as
each generation read and interpreted the act through glasses tinted by the
dominant "thought" of the times. It was this process and not the Clayton
Act which put teeth into the anti-trust laws. As time passed, so did old
prejudice, and the Sherman Act gained such prestige and force as to conflict
with the Clayton Act, thereby culminating with the controversy in the
instant case.
Accepting the fact that the Clayton Act could have• been passed as a
statement of congressional policy, it is submitted that it is not unreasonable
to give the Sherman Act the full force of its wording; and on its face, it
covers these cases. It seems painfully obvious that the opposition to this,
in the five district courts, has been motivated by the same thinking that has
tenaciously opposed every step taken in an anti-trust direction. While these
13 Ibid.
14 202 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1962).
15
 Id. at 642. See United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187, 194
(D. N.C. 1942). A major difficulty lay in the placing of responsibility since the larger
companies had so many officers. Thus, another reason was that it would facilitate getting
to those who ordered the act as well as those who carried it out. 51 Cong. Rec. 9047
(1914) (remarks of Representative Floyd). •
16
 See, e.g., In re Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (N.D. III. 1894), aff'd on other grounds, 158
U.S. 564 (1895).
17 See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
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courts are justified in assuming that there is a difference between sections 1
and 14, it appears that the difference they have selected is one strictly picked
out of the air and based on, at best, a very disputable congressional history.
The Supreme Court acted wisely in putting a sound and just finale on a
formalistic argument and furthered the progress of anti-trust laws rather
than giving them a crippling blow as they might have done.
STEPHEN J. PARIS
Anti-Trust—Sherman Act—Price Fixing—Refusal to Deal.—Klein v.
American Luggage Works, Inc,---The plaintiff Klein, a retailer brought
this private anti-trust action2 against, American Luggage Works, a: manu-
facturer, John Wanamaker Philadelphia, Inc. and Strawbridge & Clothier,
competing retailers, for treble damages for injuries resulting from a conspiracy
in violation of the Sherman Act. 2 The conspiratorial violation was "alleged
to be a resale price maintenance scheme implemented by the sanction of the
defendant manufacturer's refusal to deal."' HELD: The manufacturer,
American, would be enjoined from refusing to supply the plaintiff pursuant to
the price fixing conspiracy and American, Wanamaker and Strawbridge were
liable in treble damages as co-conspirators.
American's policy was to show catalogues to its new and prospective
customers with suggested retail prices, and preticket each individual item of '
luggage with a tag indicating the suggested retail price. Prospective dealers
not desiring to conform to the prices were denied supply. Each dealer was
informed that compliance with the catalogue and preticketed price was
mandatory, and that non-compliance would result in termination, after an
investigation by an American representative. Klein was discounting
American Luggage for which he was repeatedly admonished by American's
salesman, who was responding to complaints from both Wanamaker and
Strawbridge sales clerks and inquiries by buyers from Wanamaker and
Strawbridge. Klein's supply was stopped one week after a visit to his store
by American's President who later refused to reinstate Klein without as-
surances that the suggested retail prices would be followed.
Against this factual background the court applied the principles found in
the Colgate and Parke Davis decisions. 5 Prior to Colgate the Supreme Court
held in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 6 that contracts by which
dealers were to sell at agreed prices were illegal under the Sherman Act. The
celebrated Colgate case followed in which, because it came to Court on the
sufficiency of the indictment, the Court stated: "And we must conclude that
as interpreted the indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with
selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not
1 Civil No. 2067 (D. Del. June 15, 1962), Trade Reg. Rep. 70,355.
2 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, 38 (1958).
3 Id, 1: "Every contract, combination, in form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy
in restraint of trade . . . , is declared to be illegal. . . ."
4 Klein v. American Luggage Works Inc., supra note 1, p. 76,425.
5 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ; United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
6 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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